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Dividend Payouts and Information Shocks
Abstract
This paper examines changes in firms’ dividend payouts following an exogenous shock to the information
environment. Traditional signaling, agency, and voluntary disclosure models predict that the more is
commonly known about a firm and its competitors in the marketplace, the less private information managers
will have to reveal themselves via costly signals or cash disbursements. To test these predictions, we analyze
the dividend payment behavior for a global sample of firms around the mandatory adoption of IFRS and
around the initial enforcement of new insider trading laws. Both events have the potential to improve the
general information environment in the economy. We find that following the two events firms are less likely to
pay (or increase) cash dividends, but more likely to cut (or stop) such payments. The changes in dividend
policy occur around the time of the informational shock and only in countries and for firms subject to the
regulatory change. In further analyses we find that the information content of dividends, measured as three-
day absolute announcement returns, is lower after the informational events. The findings underscore that
firms’ payout policies, among other things, depend on the extent of information about all firms in the
economy.
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This paper examines changes in firms’ dividend payouts following an exogenous shock to the 
information environment. Traditional signaling, agency, and voluntary disclosure models predict 
that the more is commonly known about a firm and its competitors in the marketplace, the less 
private information managers will have to reveal themselves via costly signals or cash 
disbursements. To test these predictions, we analyze the dividend payment behavior for a global 
sample of firms around the mandatory adoption of IFRS and around the initial enforcement of 
new insider trading laws. Both events have the potential to improve the general information 
environment in the economy. We find that following the two events firms are less likely to pay 
(or increase) cash dividends, but more likely to cut (or stop) such payments. The changes in 
dividend policy occur around the time of the informational shock and only in countries and for 
firms subject to the regulatory change. In further analyses we find that the information content of 
dividends, measured as three-day absolute announcement returns, is lower after the informational 
events. The findings underscore that firms’ payout policies, among other things, depend on the 
extent of information about all firms in the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
In perfect and complete financial markets a firm’s value is not affected by its dividend 
policy (Miller and Modigliani 1961).  However, if markets are less than perfect, for instance, in 
the presence of taxes, asymmetric information, or incomplete contracts, dividend payouts are 
economically meaningful.  In this study, we focus on the role of cash dividends as a means for 
managers to convey information about their type, firm profitability, risk, or other value relevant 
items to corporate outsiders.  In such a setting, dividends can serve as signaling device.1  The 
basic idea behind dividend signaling models is that managers adjust dividend payments to signal 
their private information about the prospects of the firm to outside investors in a way that is too 
costly for lower quality firms to replicate (e.g., Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 1985; John 
and Williams 1985).  Thus, dividends serve as a costly mechanism that helps management 
credibly overcome the adverse selection problem. 
While most empirical studies of dividend signaling examine the relation between today’s 
signal and future realizations of firm performance (e.g., Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler 1997; 
Nissim and Ziv 2001; Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan 2002), we study the relative costs of 
dividend payouts as a signal and how firms’ cost tolerance varies as a function of the extent of 
the adverse selection problem between corporate insiders and outsiders.  More specifically, we 
examine changes to firms’ dividend signaling behavior when they experience an exogenous 
shock to the information environment.  The intuition is that a richer information environment 
with more useful and transparent accounting information should mitigate part of the adverse 
                                                           
1
  We motivate and develop the paper’s empirical predictions primarily from a signaling perspective.  However, 
we can derive the same predictions under the free cash flow hypothesis (e.g., Lang and Litzenberger 1989) or 
in a disclosure framework in which dividends serve as a voluntary disclosure (with little or no discretion) about 
the risky assets of the firm (e.g., Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988; Verrecchia 1990).  See Section 2 for details.  
Furthermore, we are aware that the use of dividends for signaling purposes is not uncontested in the literature 
(see e.g., Allen and Michaely 2003 for an overview). 
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selection problem between managers and investors, thereby decreasing the propensity of 
managers to communicate private information through dividend signaling.  Such a prediction 
follows from the general setup of the signaling models.  With a good type and a bad type firm, 
the good type firm tries to distinguish itself by issuing a signal as long as the costs associated 
with the signal fall below the additional valuation premium from escaping the pooling 
equilibrium.  If the firms’ information environment improves, for instance, because firms are 
required to adopt a more transparent set of accounting standards or existing reporting and 
disclosure rules are more tightly enforced, outside investors should be better able to assess each 
individual firm’s type a priori.  As a result, the expected valuation premium for the good type 
firm becomes lower, and (assuming the costs of signaling remain the same) the firm is less likely 
to issue a dividend signal.  Hence, among other things, a firm’s dividend signaling behavior 
should reflect changes in the extent of the adverse selection problem over time. 
We empirically test these predictions in a large global dataset with dividend payment 
information for firms from 38 countries over the 1993 to 2008 period.  Using international data 
allows us to exploit the larger variation in adverse selection across countries and increases the 
likelihood of identifying firms that use dividend payouts as information signals.2  In addition, we 
observe more exogenous shocks to firms’ information environment, and these shocks are not 
necessarily aligned in time, which often is the case in single country studies.  This approach 
strengthens our identification strategy. 
                                                           
2
  For instance, it has been shown that dividend signaling is prevalent in countries like the U.K. (Braggion and 
Moore 2011) or informative with regard to current earnings in countries like Germany (Amihud and Murgia 
1997).  At the same time, the U.S. evidence on dividend signaling is rather mixed (e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Skinner 2000; Nissim and Ziv 2001; Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan 2002), which might be due to 
the existence and popularity of less costly alternatives like share repurchases (Fama and French 2001).  In our 
global sample we find that the proportion of firms with share repurchases consistently hovers below the ten 
percent mark, and that share repurchases rather behave as complements than substitutes for dividends (at the 
same time the nominal amount of share repurchases increases substantially over the sample period). 
 3
Specifically, we utilize two separate country-level events that both have the potential to 
improve the general information environment for a large portion of the firms in an economy.  
First, we consider the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
that took place in the mid 2000’s around the globe.  Compared to local GAAP in many countries, 
IFRS is more capital-market oriented and provides more extensive measurement and disclosure 
rules (e.g., Ding et al. 2007; Bae, Tan, and Welker 2008).  Consistent with this notion, several 
studies have shown capital-market benefits, improvements of accounting properties, and positive 
effects on financial analysts’ ability to forecast future performance around the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS (e.g., Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008; Daske et al. 2008; Byard, Li, and Yu 
2011).3  Our second informational event is a country’s initial enforcement of newly introduced 
insider trading (IT) laws.  As Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) have shown, it is rather the first 
prosecution than the introduction of IT laws that matter for capital market participants to update 
their priors.  Consistently, evidence suggests that analyst following increases, analysts forecast a 
broader set of measures, financial reporting quality improves, and stock prices become more 
informative upon the restriction of insider trading (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2005; Hail 
2007; Fernandes and Ferreira 2009; Zhang and Zhang 2012).  Thus, both events are associated 
with a general improvement of the information environment.  Moreover, because the events 
occur at the country level, they are largely exogenous for the individual firm.4 
                                                           
3
  Note that we do not require or stipulate that the improvement of firms’ information environment is driven by 
the adoption of IFRS per se (as it has been shown that this is not necessarily the case; e.g., Daske et al. 2013; 
Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 2012).  We rather use mandatory IFRS adoption as a proxy for changes in firms’ 
information environment due to various (undefined) reasons.  Furthermore, the effects of IFRS adoption do not 
have to apply to each and every firm in the economy.  As long as at least some firms are affected, or 
management ex ante expects a leveling of the playing field, the firm might adjust its dividend policy. 
4
  Unless a firm decides to avoid IFRS reporting or IT enforcement by going private or moving the trading of its 
shares to an unregulated market. 
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We start our analyses with descriptive evidence on firms’ payout policies.  For our global 
sample contained in Worldscope we find that the proportion of dividend paying firms decreases 
from about 76% to 50% over the 1993 to 2008 period.  At the same time, the proportion of firms 
with share repurchases, which in the U.S. have been shown to act as a substitute (Grullon and 
Michaely 2002), never exceeds 10%.  In terms of nominal amounts, both dividend payments and 
share repurchases more than quadruple over time, suggesting that relatively fewer firms 
distribute more cash to their shareholders.  When we zoom in on the two informational events 
and distinguish between treatment and benchmark firms, different trends appear.  For instance, 
while the proportion of dividend paying firms after the IFRS mandate decreases sharply, the 
same number decreases only slightly and with a delay in countries with no change in the 
accounting standards.  A similar pattern is present around the first prosecution of new IT laws. 
To formally test the differential time-series, we next conduct a difference-in-differences 
analysis, and estimate changes in the propensity of dividend payments following the two 
informational events using logit regression analysis.  We find that after the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS and after the first enforcement of IT laws firms are less likely to pay cash dividends and 
undertake fewer dividend per share increases (or dividend initiations) but more frequent dividend 
per share decreases (or cessations of dividend payments).  This finding holds in the full sample, 
when holding the sample constant, after including additional controls like the wedge between 
dividend and capital gains tax rates, and in a specification with firm fixed effects.  In an attempt 
to assess our identification strategy, we show that the change in dividend paying behavior starts 
around the time of the informational event, and is not present in countries that did not adopt 
IFRS or in which there was no change in IT enforcement over the sample period.  The effect also 
does not extend to a subset of firms that presumably was already more transparent and hence, 
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less likely to rely on dividend payouts as information signal, namely firms that voluntarily 
switched to IFRS before the mandate and firms whose shares were cross-listed on a U.S. 
exchange. 
In a second series of tests, we examine changes to the information content of dividend 
announcements.  If dividend payouts become less informative because there exists more 
common information to begin with, we expect investors to make smaller revisions to their priors 
upon the release of the dividend signal.  We measure the information content of dividend 
announcements with three-day absolute abnormal stock returns.  Results from an OLS regression 
analysis indicate that dividend announcement returns are lower following the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS and the first enforcement of IT laws, not only compared to the firms’ own 
history but also relative to the benchmark firms.  This finding applies to all dividend payments, 
and separately for dividend per share increases and reductions.  Again, we do not find lower 
dividend announcement returns for the subset of voluntary IFRS firms and firms with a U.S. 
cross-listing, as one would expect if these firms already have more transparent reporting before.  
Thus, in line with the propensity results, the information content analysis suggests that payments 
of cash dividends have become a less useful tool for managers to overcome the adverse selection 
or moral hazard problem after an information shock to the firms in the economy. 
Finally, we extend our logic to a firm-specific instead of a country-wide informational event.  
That is, we center our analyses around the voluntary adoption of IFRS reporting and around the 
(voluntary) cross-listing on a U.S. exchange.  Both firm events have been shown, under certain 
circumstances, to go along with an improvement of the information environment (e.g., Barth, 
Landsman, and Lang 2008; Daske et al. 2013; Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva 2006; Hail and Leuz 
2009), and therefore have the potential to affect the relative costs of dividends as information 
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signal.  Yet, in this case the firm does not react to an exogenous information shock, but to its 
own disclosure choices.5  Consistent with this idea, we find that the likelihood of dividend 
payments and the information content of dividend announcements are lower after firms have 
voluntarily switched to IFRS reporting.  However, we do not find such evidence after firms have 
cross-listed their shares on a U.S. exchange. 
Our study contributes to the literature in at least two ways.  First, we show that an 
exogenous shock to the information environment affects firms’ demand for and choice of 
dividends as an information signal.  This finding is relevant for various theories of dividend 
payouts.  From a signaling perspective, it provides a new explanation for changes in dividend 
policies aside from taxes (Bernheim and Wantz 1995) or the availability of less costly substitutes 
like share repurchases (Grullon and Michaely 2002; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 2000).  It 
also empirically shows that firms’ cost tolerance of issuing a signal depends on the extent of 
information about all firms in the economy.  Under the free cash flow hypothesis, the evidence 
lends support to the prediction that better monitoring reduces concerns about overinvestment and 
hence lets managers retain more cash within the firm, which else they would have paid out to 
show their commitment to shareholder interests.  In a voluntary disclosure framework, the 
finding shows that more precise common information reduces the need for managers to release 
private information about future firm performance via dividends (e.g., Verrecchia 1990).  On a 
more descriptive level, we provide evidence that firms’ payout policies, among other things, 
reflect a country’s mandatory disclosure and reporting rules and regulatory environment. 
                                                           
5
  Similar to our main analyses, we do not require to identify the exact reasons for the change in the information 
environment or that all firms are equally affected for our predictions to apply.  However, because by definition 
voluntary IFRS adoption and U.S. cross-listings are endogenous (with other factors potentially affecting firms’ 
dividend policy), we see this as a weaker power test. 
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Second, we contribute to the literature on the economic consequences of disclosure (see 
Leuz and Wysocki 2008 for an overview), and show that changes in the general information 
environment have real consequences in terms of reducing the frequency and in some instances 
the amount of cash payouts to investors.  This interpretation might help clarify prior evidence on 
the link between information quality and investment efficiency (e.g., Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 
2009) in that better information not just mitigates under-investment via relaxing financing 
constraints, but also by increasing the availability of cash (from dividends).  Finally, our 
evidence highlights the role that regulatory changes to the disclosure environment might play in 
reducing the deadweight costs of signaling (Miller and Rock 1985). 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we develop the hypotheses 
and discuss the related literature.  In Section 3, we outline the research design, describe the 
sample selection, and provide descriptive statistics.  Section 4 contains the results of the 
propensity and information content analyses of dividend payments.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis Development and Related Literature 
In this section, we discuss the general relation between the common information 
environment and dividend payouts as a device to convey private information, and from within 
the signaling perspective develop a simple expository model to derive our main hypotheses.  We 
then review the empirical evidence on dividend payouts to place our predictions in context. 
2.1. Information Environment and Dividend Signaling 
Spence (1973, 1974) formalizes a theory of signaling, in which (privately informed) sellers 
in a marketplace emit a signal about a commodity and buyers without inside information respond 
to that signal.  While Spence’s primary focus was on the labor market, his theory has also been 
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applied to financial markets in which there is an adverse selection problem with shareholders 
unable to distinguish (a priori) the ‘quality’ of a cross-section of firms (e.g., Bhattacharya 1979; 
Miller and Rock 1985).  These signaling models build on the idea that managers (with private 
information about the prospects of the firm) can send a ‘signal of quality’ to outside investors 
which ‘lower quality firms’ find too costly to replicate (see Allen and Michaely 2003 for an 
overview).  Many authors suggest that dividend announcements or payouts serve to convey such 
inside information to corporate outsiders, and do so at a sensible cost.  Hence, they consider 
dividends an ideal signaling device. 
Most empirical studies of dividend signaling examine the relation between today’s signal 
and future realizations of firm performance or focus on the tax-induced costs of signaling (see 
Section 2.2).  At the same time, relatively little is known about the direct relation between the 
magnitude of the adverse selection problem and a firm’s signaling behavior.6  We contribute to 
filling this void by investigating whether an exogenous change in the information environment 
impacts the frequency and information content of firms’ dividend signaling.  Our primary 
hypotheses relate to a change in the information environment for the average firm in the 
economy, for instance, due to new disclosure and reporting regulation.  The intuition is that a 
richer information environment with more useful accounting information should mitigate part of 
the adverse selection problem between managers and investors.  This in turn decreases 
managers’ incentives to communicate private information through financial signaling. 
A simple theoretical characterization aids the exposition of the above intuition and serves as 
basis for our empirical predictions.  There are two types of firms in the universe – good and bad.  
α represents the fraction of the good type, and 1–α
 
is the fraction of the bad type.  The good type 
                                                           
6
  One exception is Dewenter and Warther (1998). 
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firm has a value of VG, the bad type firm has a value of VB, and VG > VB.  The cost of signaling 
for the good type is K, and the cost of signaling for the bad type is 2K.  While investors do not 
know whether a specific firm (e.g., Firmi) is the good or bad type, the fraction of the good type 
firms in the economy (i.e., α) is common knowledge. 
In the base case with no information or very poor information, investors price every firm at 
αVG + (1–α)VB, which is the weighted average value and is less than VG.  In order to avoid being 
under-valued, the good type firm issues a signal to distinguish itself, but only if VG – K > αVG + 
(1–α)VB.  This implies that the upper bound of the signaling cost the good type firm is willing to 
bear equals K = (1–α)(VG – VB). 
Now we introduce the effect of better information for the average firm.  The critical 
assumption is that when the information environment improves, investors can assess the type of 
a specific firm (good or bad) more precisely a priori.  For example, suppose Firmi is the good 
type.  With better information, investors’ updated priors for Firmi being the good type is larger 
than the unconditional probability (i.e., αi > α).  Consequently, the upper bound of the signaling 
cost the good type firm is willing to bear changes to K' = (1–αi)(VG – VB).  Under the assumption 
that αi > α, we have K' < K.  It follows that for the good type firm, the cost tolerance level of 
signaling has become lower in the richer information environment.  Assuming that the absolute 
cost of signaling remains the same (e.g., Ki for Firmi), more good type firms will hit the threshold 
level and not issue a signal any longer.  With regard to dividends as a signaling device, this leads 
to the following hypothesis (in alternative form):7,8 
                                                           
7
  If we assume αi < α (i.e., the updated probability of being a good type firm is lower), then K' > K, and we 
would expect fewer good type firms to hit the threshold (assuming there are some good type firms left) leading 
to an increase in dividend signaling. 
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H1:  After an exogenous improvement of the common information environment, firms will pay 
fewer dividends. 
Empirically, we expect to observe a lower propensity to pay dividends for firms subjected to 
an informational shock that improves financial reporting transparency.  At the same time, these 
firms should be less likely to initiate or increase dividend-per-share payouts, and more likely to 
cease or cut such payments. 
Our second hypothesis deals with the market reaction to the information signal.  It follows 
from the above characterization.  With better information the good type firm faces a lower 
valuation premium to be gained from signaling.  That is, in a richer information environment 
(and without signaling), investors price the good type firm at the weighted average value of αiVG 
+ (1–αi)VB, which is greater than the average value of αVG + (1–α)VB  with poor information.  
Thus, (holding the absolute cost of the signal Ki constant) the average market reaction by 
investors should be lower upon the release of the signal.  This leads to the following hypothesis 
regarding the information content of dividend payouts (in alternative form): 
H2:  After an exogenous improvement of the common information environment, the information 
content of dividend payments is lower. 
Empirically, we expect to observe a reduced market reaction for all dividend payments 
regardless whether they mark an increase or decrease in dividends per share. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8
  We can also derive hypothesis H1 from the voluntary disclosure literature.  For instance, Dye (1985), Jung and 
Kwon (1988, Proposition 3), and Verrecchia (1990, Corollary 2) show that the more is known about a set of 
risky assets a priori (or commonly), the less pressure the market exerts on a manger to reveal what he or she 
knows privately.  If we interpret dividends as disclosure about the risky assets (e.g., confirming that earnings 
information is backed up by cash; see e.g., Amihud and Murgia 1997), then an improvement in the general 
knowledge about the risky assets leads to fewer dividend payments.  Similarly, under the free cash flow 
hypothesis, dividends are seen as a disciplinary mechanism subjecting managers to the forces of the capital 
markets (e.g., Lang and Litzenberger 1989).  Better information enhances the monitoring ability of outside 
shareholders, thereby reducing the need for dividend payouts to mitigate concerns about overinvestment. 
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Finally, we briefly discuss the consequences that an information shock might have on firms 
that use signaling devices other than dividends or that do not rely on signaling.  We distinguish 
two cases.  First, if investors can already infer VG from the firms’ financial reports because their 
disclosures are transparent enough to avoid pooling, no dividend signaling is needed and the 
exogenous change in the information environment should have no effect.  For instance, non-U.S. 
firms whose shares are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange are subject to extensive filing 
requirements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and to market pressures by 
financial analysts and the media.  This can lead to substantial market benefits due to lower 
information asymmetries (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004; Hail and Leuz 2009).  For these 
firms, a general improvement of the information environment likely has no effect at all.  Second, 
there might be firms for which the information shock cancels out an existing signal.  That is, the 
good type firm uses a signaling device other than dividends whose effect on investors’ priors is 
similar to the information shock.  In that case, the good type firm likely has to adjust its signaling 
strategy and even initiate or increase dividend signaling.  For instance, the voluntary adoption of 
IFRS has been shown, under certain circumstances, to improve a firm’s transparency (e.g., Barth, 
Landsman, and Lang 2008; Daske et al. 2013), and hence could serve for signaling purposes.  
However, once IFRS reporting is mandatory, the value of the signal becomes moot, and firms 
might have to look for alternative ways to signal their type.9 
                                                           
9
  Note that it is not clear whether voluntary IFRS adoption is an effective signaling tool because not all voluntary 
IFRS adopting firms necessarily improve the transparency of their financial reporting (Daske et al. 2013).  In 
that case, we would expect H1 and H2 to apply when the general information environment improves (i.e., 
voluntary IFRS adopters should see fewer dividend payouts and a reduction in information content). 
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2.2. Payout Policy as a Signaling Device 
In this section, we briefly summarize the empirical evidence on dividend payout policy as a 
signaling device.10  The majority of dividend signaling studies focuses on U.S. firms, and we can 
classify them into three categories: (1) studies that examine the relation between dividend 
changes and subsequent earnings changes, (2) studies on the stock market reaction to unexpected 
dividend changes, and (3) studies on tax-based dividend signaling.  The first two categories 
center on the necessary conditions for dividend signaling; the third category relies on the 
sufficient conditions for dividends to act as a costly signal. 
Studies in the first category follow the argument that if managers’ private information 
affects their decisions about dividend payouts, then dividend changes should be followed by 
subsequent earnings changes in the same direction.  Consequently, forecasts of future earnings 
that include dividend information should be superior to those without dividend information.  
While several studies find no or only weak support of this argument (e.g., Gonedes 1978; 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 1996; Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler 1997; Grullon, 
Michaely, and Swaminathan 2002), there exist counterexamples.  For instance, Nissim and Ziv 
(2001) provide strong evidence that dividend changes are positively related to future earnings, 
profitability, and abnormal earnings.  Similarly, for a sample of U.K firms at the turn of the 19th 
century (and therefore in a setting with little interference by taxation and other institutional 
constraints), Braggion and More (2011) find that contemporaneous dividend changes predict 
future earnings changes.  Finally, Yoon and Starks (1995) extend the analysis of dividend 
payouts’ predictive power to future capital expenditures and analyst earnings forecast revisions. 
                                                           
10
  Aside from signaling, several other explanations exist for firms’ dividend policy such as agency conflicts (e.g., 
Lang and Litzenberger 1989; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 2006) or clientele effects (e.g., Dhaliwal, 
Erickson, and Trezevant 1999; Graham and Kumar 2006; Dahlquist, Robertsson, and Rydqvist 2007). 
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Studies in the second category argue that if dividends act as a signaling device about firms’ 
future prospects, then changes in dividends should convey information to the market and lead to 
a reaction by investors.  A number of studies report significant excess returns around the 
announcement of dividend changes: positive (negative) announcement returns are associated 
with positive (negative) changes in dividends (e.g., Petit 1972; Aharony and Swary 1980; Healy 
and Palepu 1988).  Probably most related in spirit to our study, Dewenter and Warther (1998) 
compare dividend policies in the U.S. and Japan.  They show that Japanese firms, particularly 
members of a keiretsu, face less adverse selection and fewer agency conflicts than U.S. firms.  
Consequently, Japanese firms experience smaller stock price reactions to dividend omissions and 
initiations, are less reluctant to stop or cut dividend payouts, and their dividends are more 
responsive to earnings changes. 
Studies in the third category focus on a tax-based explanation of dividend signaling.  All 
else equal, a dividend change of a given size should convey more information in periods when 
the tax differential between dividends and capital gains is higher.  Consistent with this idea and 
hence dividend signaling, Bernheim and Wantz (1995) show that the share price reaction to 
dividend changes is larger in periods following an increase in dividend tax rates.  Amihud and 
Murgia (1997) study the market reaction to dividend changes in Germany where dividends are 
favorably taxed relative to capital gains.  Contrary to the prediction from the tax-based signaling 
models, they find a similar market reaction to dividend changes as in the U.S.11 
                                                           
11
  Similarly, Denis and Osobov (2008) find that in a cross-country setting dividend payouts are concentrated 
among the largest, most profitable firms, with retained earnings comprising a large fraction of total equity.  
They conclude that these are the firms least likely in need of costly signals to convey private information. 
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3. Research Design and Data 
In this section, we describe our empirical identification strategy and develop the regression 
models to test our two main hypotheses.  We then discuss the sample selection and variable 
construction and provide descriptive statistics on payout policies in our global sample. 
3.1. Empirical Model and Identification Strategy 
We examine the impact of an informational shock on dividend payouts using a large panel 
dataset with yearly firm-level observations from 38 countries around the world.  Specifically, we 
investigate whether (i) the propensity of firms to pay dividends, and (ii) the information content 
of dividend announcements change surrounding significant improvements in the information 
environment for the average firm in the economy.  That is, we examine the effects of changes in 
the adverse selection and moral hazard problems on dividend payouts from both the perspective 
of the firm and the market.  To test for changes in the propensity of paying dividends following 
an informational event (H1), we estimate the following logit regression model: 
Pr(Dividend Payments) = β0 + β1 InfoEvent + ∑ βj Controlsj + ∑ βi Fixed Effectsi + ε. (1) 
The dependent variable, Dividend Payments, is a binary indicator variable marking 
positive dividends per share (set equal to ‘1’).  In years without dividend payments or in case of 
missing data, we set this variable to ‘0’.  In some of the analyses, we replace the dividend 
payments variable with indicators for year-to-year increases (decreases) in dividends per share. 
Our main variable of interest is the difference-in-differences estimator InfoEvent.  This 
variable takes on the value of ‘1’ for all firm-years subjected to the informational shock and ‘0’ 
otherwise.  We use two exogenous country-level events to proxy for a general improvement of 
the information environment in an economy, namely the mandatory adoption of IFRS in many 
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countries around the world and the first prosecution under newly introduced insider trading (IT) 
laws.12  The first event led to accounting standards that compared to many local GAAPs are 
more capital-market oriented and provide more extensive measurement and disclosure rules (e.g., 
Ding et al. 2007; Bae, Tan, and Welker 2008).  Consistent with this notion, several studies have 
shown that mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with capital-market benefits, improvements 
of accounting properties, and positive effects on analysts’ ability to forecast future earnings for at 
least some firms in the economy (e.g., Daske et al. 2008; Byard, Li, and Yu 2011; Landsman, 
Maydew, and Thornock 2012).  The second event follows from the finding in Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002) who show that it is rather the first prosecution than the introduction of IT laws that 
matter for capital market participants to update their priors.  Consistently, evidence suggests that 
analyst following increases, analysts forecast a broader set of measures, financial reporting 
quality improves, and share prices become more informative upon the restriction of insider 
trading (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2005; Hail 2007; Fernandes and Ferreira 2009; Zhang 
and Zhang 2012).13  For both informational events, H1 predicts that β1 < 0, consistent with a 
reduction in the propensity to pay dividends. 
The model in Eq. (1) also includes a comprehensive set of firm-level Controlsj (see 
Section 3.2) and Fixed Effectsi.  These variables are important because a firm’s dividend policy 
also reflects such factors as cash constraints, investment opportunities, profitability, payout 
history, or alternative payout mechanisms.  In our main specification, we include country, one-
digit SIC industry, and year fixed effects, which account for time-invariant unobserved 
                                                           
12
  Note that we do not stipulate that either IFRS adoption or IT enforcement per se lead to an improvement in the 
information environment, but rather these events proxy for changes in the disclosure and reporting policies of 
some firms around the time they took place. 
13
  The impact of insider trading on the information environment is not a priori clear.  On the one hand, the 
presence of insiders can crowd out the information collection of outside investors.  On the other hand, insider 
trading can contribute to the timely incorporation of new information into stock prices.  Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2009) find that in their global sample of firms tightening insider trading laws improves the information 
environment via either more informative stock prices or increased public information collection. 
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correlated variables along those dimensions (e.g., country-specific restrictions or general trends 
in dividend payouts over time).  As both mandatory IFRS adoption and IT enforcement are 
regulatory initiatives on the country level, we draw statistical inferences based on standard errors 
clustered by country.14 
To test hypothesis H2 (i.e., whether the information content of dividends changes after an 
informational event), we build on Eq. (1) and estimate the following OLS regression model: 
CAR(Div. Announcement) = α0 + α1 InfoEvent + ∑ αj Controlsj + ∑ αi Fixed Effectsi + ν. (2) 
We use three-day Dividend Announcement Returns as the dependent variable, and 
compute them as the absolute value of the cumulative abnormal returns around the declaration 
date of firms’ annual dividend per share.  Abnormal returns are equal to the daily raw return of a 
firm’s share minus the return on the local market index.  We use the same definition and coding 
of InfoEvent in the analysis and hence, under H2 expect α1 < 0, suggesting a reduction in 
information content of dividend announcements.  We use a different set of firm-level Controlsj in 
the information content analysis (see Section 3.2) because the main concern here is the effect of 
confounding events like earnings announcements or the magnitude of the change in dividends as 
well as firm attributes related to the announcement of dividend payouts.  The model includes 
country, industry, and year Fixed Effectsi, and we again assess the statistical significance of the 
coefficients with standard errors clustered by country. 
3.2. Sample and Variable Description 
Our sample comprises all firm-year observations between 1993 and 2008, for which we 
have sufficient Worldscope and Datastream data to estimate our base regressions in Eq. (1).  We 
                                                           
14
  We also provide results using firm fixed effects in the robustness tests.  Furthermore, the results remain largely 
unaffected and none of the inferences change if we double-cluster the standard errors by country and year. 
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start in 1993 because before that no reliable dividend data is available in Worldscope.  We 
require firms to have total assets of 10 US$ million or more, and limit the sample to countries 
with at least 10 observations with dividend information.15  This leaves us with a maximum of 
254,073 firm-year observations from 38 countries.  Table 1 provides a sample breakdown of 
unique firms and firm-years by country and year.  It also contains information on the number of 
dividend payments, and dividend per share increases and decreases.  The latter two numbers 
include the initiation and the cessation of dividend payments. 
As Panel A shows, dividend payments are fairly common around the globe.  In 58% of the 
years, firms paid out a dividend, ranging from a high of 84% in Japan to a low of 35% in 
Canada.  In all countries, firms are more likely to increase their dividend payments than to cut 
dividends per share, suggesting that a firm’s payout history is an important determinant of 
dividend policy.  Panel A also lists the year when IFRS reporting became mandatory (Daske et 
al. 2008) and when the first IT enforcement took place (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002).16 
Panel B shows the general trend in dividend payments over time.  The number of dividend 
payments, increases, or decreases goes down over the sample period.  Even so, almost half of the 
firms continue to pay dividends at the end of the sample period in 2008.  This is remarkable 
because 2008 coincides with the beginning of the global financial crisis, which likely contributed 
to the unusually low number of dividend increases and the unusually high number of dividend 
cuts in that year.  The negative time trend becomes even more obvious in Figure 1, Panel A, in 
which we plot the proportion of dividend paying firms from 1993 to 2008.  From 2001 on, the 
                                                           
15
  We further exclude firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS before the mandate or whose shares are cross-listed on 
a U.S. exchange from the base sample, but will use them in separate analyses later (see Section 4.4). 
16
  When coding the InfoEvent indicator we use December 31st of the mandatory IFRS year as the cutoff value.  
For IT enforcement, we assign it to ‘1’ in the year the first prosecution took place in a country.  Because we do 
not have the exact enforcement date, we assess this research design choice in the robustness test section. 
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downward trend came to a halt, and there was no further reduction in firms that paid a dividend.  
The graph also shows that internationally share repurchases never gained the same popularity as 
in the U.S. (Fama and French 2001).  The proportion of firms with share repurchases hovers 
below the 10 percent mark.  In terms of nominal amounts, a different picture appears.  As Panel 
B of Figure 1 illustrates both total dividend payments and share repurchases surged substantially 
over the sample period.  The two graphs taken together suggest that relatively fewer firms 
disbursed increasingly larger cash amounts to shareholders, in particular when it comes to the 
small number of firms with share repurchases.  These time-series trends in the data underscore 
the importance of our difference-in-differences design. 
In Table 2, we present descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses.  
In Eq. (1), the propensity model, we use the following control variables: the binary indicator 
Share Repurchases stands for an alternative payout mechanism to dividends.  A negative sign 
suggests that the two ways of disbursing cash to shareholders act as substitutes; a positive sign 
indicates that they are complements.  Total Assets are a proxy for firm size and maturity.  Larger, 
more mature firms are more likely to pay dividends.  The Market-to-Book ratio serves as a proxy 
for growth opportunities and indicates the need for firms to retain cash.  We expect a negative 
sign.  Financial Leverage is a proxy for a firm’s capital structure and interest payments, but also 
for potential agency conflicts.  Both suggest a negative sign.  We expect more profitable firms, 
measured with Return on Assets, to be more likely to pay dividends.  In line with Chay and Suh 
(2009) we include Return Variability as a proxy for firms’ cash-flow uncertainty.  Firms with 
higher stock volatility are less likely to pay dividends fearing future cash shortfalls.  Finally, we 
include a lagged Dividend Payments indicator in the model to capture a firm’s payout history. 
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In Eq. (2), the information content model, the following control variables are included: an 
Overlap with Earnings Announcement indicator, which takes on the value of ‘1’ if the earnings 
announcement occurs within five days of the dividend announcement.  If so, the coefficient 
should be positive.  ∆ Dividend per Share and ∆ Earnings per Share are the year-to-year changes 
in dividends and earnings per share, and capture the news effect.17  We also include size, market-
to-book, leverage, and profitability.  For more details on the variable measurement, see the notes 
to Table 2. 
4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we first describe the results of the propensity analyses of paying dividends.  
We then assess the identification strategy we employ to capture changes in the information 
environment in an economy, and conduct various robustness tests.  Next, we discuss the results 
of the tests on the changes in the information content of dividend announcements.  We conclude 
with an extension of our analyses to firm-level information shocks. 
4.1. Analyses of the Propensity to Pay Dividends 
We start examining hypothesis H1 with graphically plotting the percentage of dividend 
paying firms separately for firms in the treatment countries and the benchmark countries 
centered on the informational events (i.e., in the event year t = 0).  Figure 2, Panel A, contains 
the graph for mandatory IFRS adoption for the 3 years before and after the informational event.  
For reference purposes we also include the total percentage of dividend payers.  As predicted, the 
trends across the two groups of firms are different.  While the proportion of dividend paying 
firms subject to the IFRS mandate decreases sharply following the regulatory change, the same 
                                                           
17
  We scale ∆ Dividend per Share and ∆ Earnings per Share by price, but obtain very similar results when using 
percentage changes or assets per share as deflator. 
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number decreases only slightly and with a delay in countries that did not require a switch in 
accounting standards.  Thus, in a relative sense, there are fewer IFRS firms paying dividends, 
and the change coincides with the introduction of the new accounting rules.  Panel B of Figure 2 
shows the same graph for IT enforcement beginning in year t–3 through year t+5.  We again 
observe that the percentage of dividend paying firms drops at a faster pace (and beginning in the 
event year) in the treatment countries relative to the benchmark countries (i.e., countries with no 
IT laws, or where the IT laws had already been enforced earlier). 
Next, we conduct a simple difference-in-differences analysis of the percentage of dividend 
paying firms around the two events and present results in Panel A of Table 3.  Such a 
comparison across the cells of a two-by-two matrix is a straightforward way to account for 
unobserved differences between treatment and benchmark firms and to control for general trends 
in the data.18  We report results for the full sample and a constant sample, for which we require at 
least eight firm-year observations per firm.  Throughout the panel, the tenor of the results is the 
same.  The difference-in-differences is always negative and highly significant, indicating that the 
proportion of dividend paying firms decreased more after IFRS adoption and after the first IT 
enforcement relative to the benchmark countries.  For example, considering the upper-left panel, 
the percentage of dividend paying firms decreases by 4.43 percentage points following the IFRS 
mandate.  At the same time, the proportion of dividend payers increases by 1.80 percentage 
points in countries without regulatory change.  The resulting difference-in-differences is -6.23 
and significant.  The results are consistent with a change in the information environment 
affecting firms’ propensity to pay dividends, at least in a univariate setting. 
                                                           
18
  To allow for a true difference-in-differences comparison we split the benchmark firms into a pre and post 
period using December 31st, 2005 (IFRS setting), and the year 1996 (IT setting) as cutoff value. 
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In Panel B of Table 3 we explicitly account for other confounding factors, and report the 
coefficients from estimating Eq. (1) using logit regression.  We tabulate results for the full 
sample (Models 1, 3, and 4) and the constant sample (Model 2).19  Our main variable of interest, 
InfoEvent, has always the expected sign (negative for dividend payments and increases; positive 
for dividend decreases).  In the IFRS setting, the coefficient is significant at the one percent level 
when using Dividend Payments as the dependent variable and at the ten percent level for 
Dividend Increases and Dividend Decreases.  In the IT setting, the InfoEvent coefficient is 
always significant at the five percent level or better.  These results suggest that firms are less 
likely to pay dividends or announce dividend increases, and more likely to cut dividends per 
share or stop dividend payments following the two informational events.  The control variables 
behave as expected and are generally highly significant.  Large, profitable firms with a history of 
paying dividends continue to do so, while highly levered firms with many growth prospects and 
volatile stock returns are less likely to disburse cash for dividends.  We find no evidence that 
share repurchases substitute for dividend payments.  If anything, they act as complements as 
shown by the significantly positive coefficients in the IT setting.20  Overall, we interpret the 
above results as consistent with a lower propensity to pay dividends after an informational shock 
that improves financial reporting transparency and reduces the adverse selection and moral 
hazard problem in the economy. 
                                                           
19
  In unreported analyses we repeat our tests (and confirm the results) for a sample of firms that is most likely to 
pay dividends (for various reasons).  That is, in a first step we estimate Eq. (1) using the U.K. observations 
(based on the finding in Braggion and Moore 2011 that U.K. firms are likely to use dividends as information 
signals).  In a second step, we apply the estimated coefficients from the U.K. model to predict the likelihood of 
dividend payments for the entire sample.  We classify all firm-years with a predicted probability greater than 
0.5 as potential dividend payers, and include them in the reduced sample (regardless whether the firm paid a 
dividend or not).  By limiting our analyses to years with an ex ante higher likelihood of dividend payments, we 
hope to reduce the confounding effects of firms that never paid a dividend during the sample period. 
20
  Note that when using Dividend Decreases as dependent variable, the expected sign on all the control variables 
reverses.  Furthermore, because by definition the lagged Dividend Payments variable takes on a value of ‘1’ for 
all dividend decreases, we do not include it in the model. 
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4.2. Assessing Identification and Robustness Tests 
The inferences we draw from the above analyses rely on the assumption that our difference-
in-differences approach is able to separate the effects of an informational shock from other 
factors potentially affecting firms’ dividend policies, in particular a general tendency toward 
fewer dividend payments over time (as seen in Panel A of Figure 1).  We therefore conduct a 
series of robustness and falsification tests to assess the validity of our empirical identification 
strategy.  If not mentioned otherwise, all tests build on our base specification for the full sample 
(i.e., Model 1 in Panel B of Table 3). 
First, we assess the timing of the informational shock and report results in Panel A of Table 
4.  Instead of estimating a single event indictor, we break up the entire sample period into four 
sub-periods by including three separate indicator variables for the two years leading up to the 
event (years t–2 and t–1), the two years around the event (years t and t+1), and the remaining 
years (t ≥ +2).  The years before t–2 serve as the base period.  If the change to the information 
environment occurs around the ‘true’ event year, we expect the first of the three indicator 
variables to be insignificant, the second (containing the ‘true’ event year) to be negative and 
smaller than the preceding period, and the third still negative but not discernable from the middle 
coefficient.  This pattern is what we observe in the IT setting.  Only after the first IT enforcement 
took place the propensity to pay dividends went down, and stayed at lower levels afterwards.  In 
the IFRS setting, the middle-period coefficient is insignificantly negative (but as indicated by the 
F-test significantly smaller than in the preceding two years).  The coefficient becomes 
significantly negative in period t ≥ +2.  Thus, it seems that around mandatory IFRS the 
information environment took longer to adapt, consistent with learning or uneven IFRS 
 23
implementation during the early years.  Overall the time-series pattern around both events is 
indicative of a change in the information environment at about the same time. 
Second, we counterfactually assign event years to the benchmark countries.  That is, we 
introduce a separate InfoEvent indicator for firms in countries that did not adopt IFRS or did not 
initiate the enforcement of IT laws during the sample period.  In the IFRS setting, the 
counterfactual event indicator is set to ‘1’ for years ending on or after December 31st, 2005; in 
the IT setting, we randomly assign the ‘true’ event dates to the benchmark countries, and do so 
for all benchmark countries and separately for countries in which the first prosecution took place 
before our sample period and countries without IT laws.21  There should be no effect around 
these artificial events for benchmark firms.  In Panel B of Table 4, we report the ‘true’ and the 
counterfactual event indicators together with p-values from an F-test comparing the two.  As 
expected, none of the counterfactual event indicators is statistically significant, and in three of 
the four cases the coefficient is significantly smaller than the ‘true’ event variable.  Only when 
comparing to the countries without IT laws, the two coefficients are not distinguishable. 
Third, we contrast the treatment effects to a set of firms for which ex ante it is not obvious 
whether the informational shock should have any effect because they presumable already follow 
a transparent reporting and disclosure regime (i.e., counterfactual firms).  More specifically, we 
include firms that voluntarily switched to IFRS reporting before it became mandatory and 
foreign firms whose shares are listed on a U.S. exchange as additional benchmark group.22  That 
is, we add a separate InfoEvent indicator for these firms to the model that takes on the value of 
‘1’ after the informational shock.  Table 4, Panel C, presents the results of the analyses.  We 
                                                           
21
  We repeat this random assignment ten times and each time the results are very similar to those reported. 
22
  We identify voluntary IFRS adopters based on Daske et al. (2013), and U.S. exchange listed firms based on 
Hail and Leuz (2009).  We require each firm to have at least one observation pre and post the informational 
events (i.e., the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the first enforcement of IT laws). 
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make two observations: (i) the treatment effect is largely unaffected by the inclusion of the 
additional firms; (ii) we do not find any significant change in dividend policy for voluntary IFRS 
adopting firms and cross-listed firms after the informational events.23  This finding suggests that 
the counterfactual firms are not affected by the change in the information environment, because 
presumably investors can already infer their type and effectively monitor managers regardless of 
dividend payouts.24 
Fourth, we conduct a series of robustness tests to assess various research design choices and 
report results in Table 5.  Panel A contains the results for the IFRS setting.  In the first three 
models, we separately add three controls: net cash flows from operations divided by total assets 
as a proxy for cash constraints, retained earnings divided by the book value of total equity as a 
proxy for firm maturity and earnings power, and the wedge between yearly dividend and capital 
gains tax rates for individuals, which captures the relative disadvantage of dividend payouts 
compared to share repurchases.  As expected, the first two additional control variables are 
significantly positive; the tax wedge is insignificant.  In the next two models, we replace the 
country and industry-fixed effects with firm-fixed effects using the full and constant sample.  
This accounts for time-invariant firm attributes, but also substantially reduces the number of 
observations due to lack of variation in the dependent variable.  Finally, we exclude observations 
from the U.S., the largest sample country, and in the last model further drop 2008, the year of the 
financial crisis, which according to Table 1 likely was unusual.  All the IFRS Adoption 
coefficients are negative and, with the exception of Model 2, significant. 
                                                           
23
  The coefficients across treatment firms and counterfactual firms are only significantly different in one of the 
four cases, which is likely due to the low power of the test because we only have very few voluntary IFRS and 
U.S. cross-listed firms. 
24
  We do not find evidence that mandatory IFRS adoption or IT enforcement cancel out an existing signal and 
require firms to re-differentiate, for instance, by increasing the propensity of dividend signaling.  We examine 
voluntary IFRS adoption and U.S. cross-listings as standalone informational events in Section 4.4. 
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Panel B of Table 5 contains the sensitivity analyses for the IT setting.  We again include the 
three additional control variables in the model (i.e., net cash flows, retained earnings and tax rate 
wedge), estimate two firm-fixed effects specifications, and exclude the U.S. observations.  
Moreover, we estimate a model in which we drop the IT enforcement year from the analysis.  
This helps avoid the misclassification of firm-years due to the unknown exact date of the initial 
prosecution of the new IT laws.  Except for Model 4, the results are significant, consistent with 
those reported earlier, and support our main prediction. 
4.3. Analyses of the Information Content of Dividend Payments 
In this section, we turn to hypothesis H2 stipulating that after an exogenous improvement to 
the information environment, the information content of dividend payments decreases.  We 
present results of estimating Eq. (2) using OLS regression in Table 6, Panel A.  We report results 
for all dividend announcements (full and constant sample), and separately for announcements of 
dividend increases and decreases.  The three-day absolute Dividend Announcement Returns serve 
as a proxy for information content.  Because we need dividend (and earnings) announcement 
dates from Worldscope, the sample is substantially smaller than in the propensity analyses.  
Throughout the panel, our main variable of interest, the InfoEvent coefficient, is negative and 
with one exception significant.  This indicates that markets react less to the announcement of 
dividend payments, increases, and decreases following the mandatory adoption of IFRS or the 
first prosecution of IT laws.  A smaller market reaction is indicative of lower information content 
of dividend payouts after an information shock.  The control variables behave largely as 
expected.  In particular, the closeness of an earnings announcement has positive spillover effects, 
and the magnitude of the dividend-per-share change matters.  Moreover, large firms with a 
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generally richer information environment to begin with seem to convey less information during 
the days of the dividend announcements. 
Next, we repeat some of the robustness tests for the information content analysis, and report 
results in Panel B of Table 6.  We estimate the information content of dividend announcements 
using firm-fixed effects instead of country and industry-fixed effects, eliminate the U.S. 
observations from the sample, and in the IFRS setting also drop the year 2008 (in the IT setting 
drop the year of the initial prosecution of the new laws).  Throughout the panel, the coefficient 
on IFRS Adoption and IT Enforcement is negative and with the exception of one of the firm-fixed 
effects specifications significant at the 11 percent level or better (two-tailed).  These results 
corroborate our earlier findings. 
Finally, in Panel C of Table 6, we again contrast the treatment effects to the change in 
information content for voluntary IFRS adopting firms and firms with a U.S. cross listing around 
the two informational events.  That is, we add a separate binary indicator for these counterfactual 
firms to the model, and code it as ‘1’ beginning at the informational event date.25  The table 
allows the following insights: (i) when we include the additional benchmark firms, the treatment 
effect of mandatory IFRS adoption and IT enforcement is largely unaffected; and (ii) neither 
voluntary IFRS firms nor U.S. cross-listed firms experience a significant decline in information 
content around the two informational events.  The latter result suggests that these firms 
presumably were already transparent enough so that investors did not have to rely on dividend 
payouts as source of private information.  Overall, the information content findings align with 
the propensity tests, and taken together suggest that after an improvement of the common 
information in the economy, firms as well as investors rely less on dividend payouts. 
                                                           
25
  We use the same data sources to identify the counterfactual firms as in Table 4, Panel C, and require voluntary 
IFRS and U.S. cross-listed firms to have at least one observation pre and post the informational event. 
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4.4. Extending the Analysis to Firm-Level Informational Shocks 
In this section, we extend the logic of our tests to two firm-specific (instead of country-
level) informational events, namely the voluntary adoption of IFRS before it became mandatory 
(from 1993 to 2004), and the cross listing of shares on a U.S. exchange (from 1993 to 2008).  
Both events have been shown, under certain circumstances, to go along with an improvement of 
the information environment (e.g., Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008; Daske et al. 2013; Bailey, 
Karolyi, and Salva 2006; Hail and Leuz 2009), and have the potential to affect firms’ dividend 
policies.  The two firm-level events address concerns regarding the time-clustering of regulatory 
changes, in particular mandatory IFRS, and offer some corroborating evidence.26 
In Table 7, we present the results from replicating the propensity and information content 
analyses, but now centered on the firm-specific informational events.  To do so, we code the 
InfoEvent indicator as ‘1’ for fiscal years with reporting under the new accounting standards (as 
identified by Daske et al. 2013) or following the initiation of the U.S. cross-listing program (as 
identified by Hail and Leuz 2009).  We require firms to have at least one observation pre and 
post voluntary IFRS adoption or the U.S. exchange listing, which substantially reduces the 
number of treatment firms.  In the voluntary IFRS setting, we find a negative and significant 
InfoEvent coefficient in both the propensity and information content analysis.  This suggests that 
voluntary IFRS adopters are less likely to pay dividends and investors react less to dividend 
announcements after voluntary IFRS adoption.  For U.S. cross-listed firms, we find negative 
InfoEvent coefficients, but the results are not statistically significant.  One explanation is that 
these are generally growing firms that could not afford to pay dividends before the cross listing. 
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  At the same time, the firm-specific events likely suffer from endogeneity issues.  However, because we are not 
interested in identifying the exact source of the change in the information environment (but rather use the 
events as a proxy for such a change), our analyses should be less affected. 
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Overall, the results around the firm-specific information events are generally consistent 
with, but weaker than in our main analyses.  We conclude that a change in the information 
environment is associated with the use of dividends, but this relation is likely mitigated in a 
voluntary disclosure setting. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines changes in firms’ propensity to pay dividends and in the information 
content of dividend announcements following an exogenous information shock.  Thus, we 
analyze the value of dividend payments as a means to convey private information from the firm’s 
and the market’s perspective.  We argue that more precise common information ex ante reduces 
the adverse selection problem between managers and investors, makes it easier ex post for 
outside shareholders to monitor management behavior, and puts less pressure on management to 
reveal private information.  All these forces should reduce the demand for and the value of 
dividend payouts as commitment and information device.  To test these predictions, we examine 
the dividend payment behavior for a global sample of firms around two events, namely the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS and the initial enforcement of new IT laws.  Both events have the 
potential to enhance the underling information structure for all firms in the economy. 
Consistent with our predictions, we find that following our two informational events firms 
are less likely to pay (or increase) cash dividends, but more likely to cut (or stop) such payments.  
The changes in dividend policy occur around the time of the informational shock and only in 
countries and for firms subject to the regulatory change.  In further analyses we find that the 
information content of dividends, measured as three-day absolute announcement returns, is lower 
after the informational events.  Finally, we extend our analysis to firm-specific instead of 
country-wide informational events, and find that the likelihood to pay dividends and the 
 29
information content of dividend announcements are lower for voluntary IFRS adopters.  In sum, 
our findings show that enhancing the information environment significantly affects firms’ 
demand for and the perceived value of dividend payments.  They also suggest that regulatory 
changes to the disclosure environment have real consequences in terms of reducing the cash 
payouts to investors and the deadweight costs of dividend signaling. 
An important caveat of our study is that the analysis focuses only on dividend payments.  
This leaves room for interesting extensions.  First, following an information shock firms might 
choose less costly ways of disbursing cash to shareholders than dividend payments.  While we 
control for share repurchases in our tests, this is still a plausible scenario.  Second, regulatory 
changes to the disclosure environment could enhance the credibility of financial reports, which in 
turn makes it possible for managers to move away from cash-based information signals with no 
or little discretion to more subjective (but less costly) means to convey private information (e.g., 
management forecasts, conference presentations, firm-initiated media coverage).  We leave these 
issues to future research. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of Dividend Paying Firms and Dividend Payouts over Time 










The figure plots the time-series of the percentage of firms with dividend payments or share repurchases (Panel A) 
and the corresponding US$ amounts (Panel B). The sample comprises all firm-year observations from 38 countries 
over the 1993 to 2008 period with dividend and control variable data available (see Table 1). We also plot a linear 
trend line for the dividend payments. We measure dividend payments using the dividends per share item in 
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Figure 2: Proportion of Dividend Paying Firms by Informational Event 










The figure plots the percentage of firms with dividend payments over time around two significant changes in firms’ 
information environment. The base sample comprises all firm-year observations from 38 countries over the 1993 to 
2008 period with dividend and control variable data available (see Table 1). In Panel A, we focus on the subset of 
years surrounding the mandatory introduction of IFRS reporting. In Panel B, we focus on the subset of years 
surrounding the first enforcement of insider trading (IT) laws. We align the observations in event time, and plot 
separate lines for the total sample, the treatment sample countries, and the benchmark countries. We measure 
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Table 1: Sample Composition by Country and Year 






Decreases Country Unique Firms 
Firm- 
Years 







Argentina 69 537 221 41.2 150 27.9 107 19.9 n.a. 1995 
Australia 1,967 10,110 4,300 42.5 3,222 31.9 1,238 12.2 2005 1996 
Austria 72 299 193 64.5 129 43.1 73 24.4 2005 n.a. 
Belgium 172 936 647 69.1 507 54.2 166 17.7 2005 1994 
Bermuda 66 307 177 57.7 123 40.1 47 15.3 n.a. n.a. 
Brazil 363 1,905 1,233 64.7 740 38.8 557 29.2 n.a. Before 1993 
Canada 1,799 9,214 3,178 34.5 2,185 23.7 993 10.8 n.a. Before 1993 
China 1,856 8,790 4,122 46.9 2,496 28.4 2,485 28.3 n.a. n.a. 
Denmark 225 2,088 1,415 67.8 785 37.6 369 17.7 2005 1996 
Finland 148 1,082 830 76.7 516 47.7 349 32.3 2005 1993 
France 1,049 5,875 3,545 60.3 2,475 42.1 1,207 20.5 2005 Before 1993 
Germany 823 3,960 1,827 46.1 1,150 29.0 798 20.2 2005 1995 
Greece 355 2,414 1,500 62.1 938 38.9 743 30.8 2005 1996 
Hong Kong 1,016 7,626 4,387 57.5 2,810 36.8 1,897 24.9 2005 1994 
Hungary 29 120 52 43.3 30 25.0 23 19.2 2005 1995 
India 1,001 5,160 4,036 78.2 2,512 48.7 874 16.9 n.a. 1998 
Indonesia 397 2,717 1,353 49.8 819 30.1 629 23.2 n.a. 1996 
Ireland 94 508 259 51.0 211 41.5 61 12.0 2005 n.a. 
Israel 197 1,138 411 36.1 269 23.6 202 17.8 2008 Before 1993 
Italy 159 817 494 60.5 319 39.0 208 25.5 2005 1996 
Japan 4,594 46,592 39,144 84.0 13,913 29.9 5,922 12.7 n.a. Before 1993 
Korea (South) 1,230 7,853 4,757 60.6 2,506 31.9 1,648 21.0 n.a. Before 1993 
Luxembourg 29 169 116 68.6 93 55.0 27 16.0 2005 n.a. 
Malaysia 1,137 8,824 5,794 65.7 3,517 39.9 2,655 30.1 n.a. 1996 
Mexico 123 868 396 45.6 288 33.2 137 15.8 n.a. n.a. 
The Netherlands 210 1,267 848 66.9 577 45.5 298 23.5 2005 1994 
New Zealand 162 961 681 70.9 456 47.5 237 24.7 2007 n.a. 
Norway 312 1,991 1,026 51.5 662 33.2 348 17.5 2005 Before 1993 
Philippines 227 1,529 608 39.8 414 27.1 254 16.6 2005 n.a. 
Singapore 691 5,004 3,481 69.6 2,047 40.9 1,594 31.9 2003 Before 1993 
South Africa 567 3,162 2,030 64.2 1,596 50.5 539 17.0 2005 n.a. 
Spain 189 1,250 889 71.1 669 53.5 260 20.8 2005 1998 
Sweden 499 3,366 1,886 56.0 1,395 41.4 405 12.0 2005 Before 1993 
Switzerland 145 1,284 979 76.2 567 44.2 224 17.4 2005 1995 
Taiwan 1,389 9,063 5,182 57.2 3,361 37.1 2,260 24.9 n.a. Before 1993 
Thailand 568 4,544 3,019 66.4 1,682 37.0 1,378 30.3 n.a. 1993 
United Kingdom 2,687 17,682 11,651 65.9 9,298 52.6 2,640 14.9 2005 Before 1993 
United States 10,281 73,061 29,355 40.2 22,900 31.3 6,302 8.6 n.a. Before 1993 
Total 36,897 254,073 146,022 57.5 88,327 34.8 40,154 15.8   
(continued) 
Table 1 (continued) 






Decreases Year Firm- Years 
N % N % N % 
1993 6,090 4,615 75.8 2,547 41.8 1,220 20.0 
1994 6,898 5,168 74.9 3,062 44.4 1,215 17.6 
1995 8,272 5,710 69.0 3,487 42.2 1,269 15.3 
1996 9,677 6,402 66.2 3,937 40.7 1,537 15.9 
1997 10,733 6,703 62.5 4,040 37.6 1,751 16.3 
1998 11,765 7,001 59.5 4,022 34.2 2,024 17.2 
1999 16,069 9,350 58.2 5,539 34.5 2,673 16.6 
2000 16,273 9,394 57.7 5,566 34.2 2,534 15.6 
2001 17,695 9,556 54.0 5,316 30.0 3,205 18.1 
2002 19,711 10,520 53.4 5,876 29.8 3,733 18.9 
2003 20,196 11,008 54.5 6,829 33.8 2,938 14.5 
2004 21,018 11,998 57.1 7,906 37.6 2,666 12.7 
2005 21,846 12,599 57.7 8,218 37.6 3,137 14.4 
2006 23,186 12,922 55.7 8,451 36.4 3,136 13.5 
2007 24,037 12,849 53.5 8,289 34.5 3,182 13.2 
2008 20,607 10,227 49.6 5,242 25.4 3,934 19.1 
Total 254,073 146,022 57.5 88,327 34.8 40,154 15.8 
 
The sample comprises a maximum of 254,073 firm-year observations from 38 countries between 1993 and 2008, for which we have sufficient Worldscope and 
Datastream data to estimate our base regressions (see Table 3). We require firms to have total assets of 10 US$ million, and limit the sample to countries with 
at least 10 dividend per share observations. We further eliminate firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS before the mandate, or whose shares are cross-listed on a 
U.S. exchange. The table reports the total number of unique firms as well as the number of firm-years and percentages by country (Panel A) and year (Panel B) 
for the following cases: (1) firm-years with actual dividend payments measured using the dividends per share item in Worldscope (field 05101), (2) firm-years 
with increases in dividends per share relative to the prior period (including the initiation of dividend payments), and (3) firm-years with decreases in dividends 
per share relative to the prior period (including the cessation of dividend payments). Panel A also lists the year of the significant changes in firms’ information 
environment: (i) when IFRS reporting became mandatory in a country (Daske et al. 2008), and (ii) when the first prosecution under insider trading laws took 
place in a country (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002). 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Regression Analyses 
 N Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Dependent Variables:         
  Dividend Payments (Indicator) 254,073 0.575 0.494      
  Dividend Increases (Indicator) 254,073 0.348 0.476      
  Dividend Decreases (Indicator) 254,073 0.158 0.365      
  Dividend Announcement Returns (3 Days) 102,566 0.036 0.037 0.000 0.011 0.024 0.048 0.177 
Control Variables:         
  Share Repurchases (Indictor) 254,073 0.060 0.237      
  Log(Total Assets) (US$ million) 254,073 12.287 2.001 7.941 10.955 12.170 13.482 17.538 
  Market-to-Book (Ratio) 254,073 2.281 2.714 0.302 0.897 1.501 2.572 14.648 
  Leverage (Ratio) 254,073 0.218 0.191 0.000 0.041 0.186 0.349 0.727 
  Return on Assets (Ratio) 254,073 0.033 0.122 -0.474 0.006 0.041 0.094 0.268 
  Return Variability (Std. Dev.) 254,073 2.751 1.204 0.772 1.846 2.548 3.477 6.169 
  Overlap with Earnings Announcement (Indictor) 102,566 0.224 0.417      
  ! Dividend per Share (Ratio) 102,566 0.002 0.015 -0.051 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.052 
  ! Earnings per Share (Ratio) 102,566 0.000 0.148 -0.415 -0.013 0.005 0.021 0.353 
 
The sample comprises a maximum of 254,073 firm-year observations from 38 countries between 1993 and 2008!for which sufficient Worldscope financial data 
and Datastream stock price data exist (see Table 1). The table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses. We employ the 
following dependent variables: Dividend Payments is a binary indicator marking firm-years with positive dividends per share (set equal to ‘1’). In firm-years 
with no dividend data or zero dividends we set this variable to ‘0’. Dividend Increases (Decreases) is a binary indicator marking firm-years with a year-to-year 
increase (decrease) in dividends per share. We measure Dividend Announcement Returns as the absolute value of the cumulative abnormal returns over the 
three days surrounding the declaration date of the annual dividends per share (field 05913). We compute abnormal returns as daily raw returns minus local 
market returns. We use the following control variables: we define a binary indicator marking firm-years with Share Repurchases as indicated in SDC Platinum. 
Total Assets are denominated in US$ million. Market-to-Book is the ratio of market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of 
total debt divided by total assets. Return on Assets is the ratio of operating income divided by average total assets. We measure Return Variability as the annual 
standard deviation of daily stock returns over a firm’s fiscal year (multiplied by 100). Overlap with Earnings Announcement is a binary indicator marking 
dividend announcements within five days of the annual earnings per share report date (field 05904). ! Dividend per Share and ! Earnings per Share are the 
year-to-year changes in dividends and earnings per share scaled by price per share at the end of the fiscal year. Accounting data and market values are 
measured as of the fiscal-year end. Except for variables with natural lower or upper bounds, we truncate all variables at the first and 99th percentile, and we use 
the natural log of the raw values where indicated. 
Table 3: Changes in Dividend Payment Behavior around Informational Events 
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Dividend Payments around Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Insider Trading Enforcement 
 Full Sample  Constant Sample 













  (a) (b) (b)-(a)   (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
54.82% 50.39% -4.43%***  68.37% 71.12% 2.75%*** Mandatory IFRS 
Adopters 
(i) 
N = 23,912 N = 25,531   
(i) 
N = 11,448 N = 10,000  
54.35% 56.15% 1.80%***  66.68% 71.80% 5.12%*** Non-IFRS  
Adopters 
(ii) 
N = 57,059 N = 61,794   
(ii) 
N = 25,712 N = 25,712  
 (i)-(ii) 0.47% -5.76%*** -6.23%***  (i)-(ii) 1.69%*** -0.68% -2.37%*** 
          














 (a) (b) (b)-(a)   (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
88.55% 61.80% -26.75%***  89.01% 76.28% -12.73%*** ! Enforcement  
Countries 
(i) 
N = 2,367 N = 25,934   
(i) 
N = 1,947 N = 9,203  
71.01% 56.21% -14.80%***  74.43% 66.14% -8.29%*** Non-Enforcement/Always 
Enforcement Countries 
(ii) 
N = 18,943 N = 117,153   
(ii) 
N = 15,773 N = 60,312  
 (i)-(ii) 17.54%*** 5.59%*** -11.95%***  (i)-(ii) 14.58%*** 10.14%*** -4.44%*** 
(continued) 
Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B: Logit Regression Analysis of Dividend Payments around Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Insider Trading Enforcement 



































Informational Events:          
  IFRS Adoption -0.350*** -0.467*** -0.262* 0.124*  – – – – 
 (-3.64) (-3.27) (-1.76) (1.69)      
  IT Enforcement – – – –  -0.534** -0.694*** -0.305** 0.464*** 
      (-2.28) (-3.18) (-2.12) (2.58) 
Control Variables:          
  Dividend Paymentst-1 4.058*** 4.493*** 2.057*** –  4.089*** 4.707*** 2.079*** – 
 (9.36) (8.14) (4.25)   (7.62) (7.52) (3.55)  
  Share Repurchases 0.085 0.038 0.099 -0.129  0.178*** 0.059 0.206*** -0.233*** 
 (0.97) (0.54) (1.45) (-1.54)  (2.79) (1.36) (3.19) (-6.76) 
  Log(Total Assets) 0.235*** 0.195*** 0.176*** -0.167***  0.188*** 0.178*** 0.116*** -0.137*** 
 (9.16) (10.74) (9.43) (-9.04)  (6.65) (6.71) (3.03) (-5.27) 
  Market-to-Book -0.073*** -0.122*** -0.008 -0.017  -0.081*** -0.103*** -0.005 -0.013 
 (-5.83) (-5.46) (-1.00) (-0.66)  (-6.38) (-4.13) (-0.65) (-0.86) 
  Leverage -1.096*** -1.354*** -0.249*** 0.657***  -1.667*** -1.784*** -0.385* 1.002*** 
 (-3.58) (-3.38) (-3.06) (5.69)  (-4.32) (-3.44) (-1.95) (15.07) 
  Return on Assets 10.541*** 11.789*** 8.746*** -8.378***  10.776*** 10.286*** 8.986*** -9.979*** 
 (7.79) (5.66) (6.96) (-11.57)  (4.63) (3.57) (5.42) (-7.67) 
  Return Variability -0.469*** -0.529*** -0.180** 0.330***  -0.634*** -0.761*** -0.308*** 0.358*** 
 (-11.56) (-7.97) (-2.42) (5.91)  (-17.46) (-20.75) (-4.17) (11.50) 
Country-, Industry-, and 
Year-Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 65.4% 68.5% 29.8% 15.6%  67.2% 70.1% 30.7% 14.6% 
N 168,296 72,872 168,296 90,288  164,397 87,235 164,397 96,208 
N Treatment Firm-Years 25,531 10,000 25,531 12,909  25,934 9,203 25,934 16,001 
N Treatment Firms 9,073 2,681 9,073 4,580  5,781 1,104 5,781 3,860 
 
The table reports changes in firms’ dividend payment behavior following a significant change in the information environment. We consider two informational 
events: (i) the mandatory introduction of IFRS reporting (from 2001 to 2008), and (ii) the first enforcement of insider trading (IT) laws (from 1993 to 2004). 
We report results for the full sample (see Table 1) and a ‘constant’ sample for which we require at least eight observations per firm. In Panel A, we report the 
number of observations and the percentage of dividend paying firms across treatment and benchmark sample countries before and after the informational 
event. For mandatory IFRS we use December 31, 2005, and for IT enforcement the year 1996 as cutoff for the benchmark firms. We indicate statistical 
significance of differences across cells with t-tests. In Panel B, we report logit coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) z-statistics based on robust standard 
errors clustered by country from regressing Dividend Payments (or Dividend Increases and Decreases) on an informational event indicator plus controls. The 
IFRS Adoption variable takes on the value of ‘1’ for fiscal years ending on or after December 31 of the year of the IFRS mandate; the IT Enforcement variable 
takes on the value of ‘1’ for all fiscal years ending in or after the year of the first IT prosecution. For details on the remaining variables see Tables 1 and 2. We 
use the natural log of the raw values and lag the variables by one year where indicated. We include country-, industry, and year-fixed effects in the regressions, 
but do not report the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
Table 4: Assessing Identification of the Changes in Dividend Payment Behavior around Informational Events 
Panel A: Analysis of Years Leading up to and Following the Informational Events 
IFRS Adoption  IT Enforcement 



















Years Relative to Event Year (t = 0):      
  Years t–2 and t–1 0.113 0.030  -0.040 -0.143 
 (0.85) (0.15)  (-0.19) (-0.51) 
      
  Years t and t+1 -0.070 -0.170  -0.613* -0.754** 
 (-0.45) (-0.77)  (-1.89) (-2.27) 
      
  Years t ! +2 -0.439*** -0.702***  -0.547** -0.801*** 
 (-2.60) (-2.73)  (-2.31) (-3.19) 
      
F-Test for Difference across Coefficients [p-value]     
  Yeart–2, t–1 = Yeart, t+1 [0.013] [0.024]  [0.124] [0.110] 
  Yeart, t+1 = Yeart ! +2 [0.040] [0.081]  [0.831] [0.879] 
      
Control Variables Included Included  Included Included 
Fixed Effects Included Included  Included Included 
N 168,296 72,872  164,397 87,235 
 
 
Panel B: Counterfactually Assigning Event Years to Benchmark Countries 




Insider Trading  
Enforcement 
‘True’ Event:      
  IFRS Adoption -0.368***  – – – 
 (-4.15)     
  IT Enforcement –  -0.676*** -0.667*** -0.537** 
   (-2.77) (-2.75) (-2.28) 
      
Counterfactual Event:      
  Non-IFRS Adoption Countries 0.125  – – – 
 (1.27)     
  Non-IT Enforcement Countries –  -0.293 – – 
   (-1.50)   
  Always-IT Enforcement Countries –  – -0.286 – 
    (-1.45)  
  Never-IT Enforcement Countries –  – – -0.192 
     (-0.42) 
      
F-Test for Difference across 
Coefficients [p-value] [0.000]  [0.090] [0.094] [0.458] 
      
Control Variables Included  Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects Included  Included Included Included 
N 168,296  164,397 164,397 164,397 
(continued) 
Table 4 (continued) 
Panel C: Changes in Dividend Payments for Firms Not Directly Affected by the Informational Event 
Around Mandatory  
IFRS Adoption  
Around Insider  
Trading Enforcement Dividend Payments as  













Counterfactual Firms:      
  Voluntary IFRS Firms -0.223 –  0.266 – 
 (-1.47)   (0.62)  
  U.S. Cross-listed Firms – 0.153  – 0.332 
  (0.61)   (0.40) 
Informational Event Firms:      
  IFRS Adoption -0.344*** -0.337***  – – 
 (-3.62) (-3.51)    
  IT Enforcement – –  -0.528** -0.532** 
    (-2.26) (-2.27) 
      
F-Test for Difference across 
Coefficients [p-value] [0.291] [0.040]  [0.159] [0.322] 
      
Indicator for Counterfactual Firms  Included Included  Included Included 
Control Variables Included Included  Included Included 
Fixed Effects Included Included  Included Included 
N 174,312 170,153  164,814 164,620 
 
The table assesses the identification of changes in firms’ dividend payment behavior following a significant change 
in the information environment. We consider two informational events: (i) the mandatory introduction of IFRS 
reporting, and (ii) the first enforcement of insider trading (IT) laws. If not indicated otherwise, we build on our base 
specification for the full sample (see Model 1 in Panel B of Table 3), and use Dividend Payments as the dependent 
variable. In Panel A, instead of estimating a single event indicator, we include three separate indicator variables for 
the two years leading up to the event (years t–2 and t–1), the two years around the event (years t and t+1), and the 
remaining years (t ! +2). In Panel B, we report the ‘true’ informational event indicators together with indicators for 
counterfactual events for the benchmark firms. That is, for each benchmark sample country we randomly assign a 
‘true’ event date and set the counterfactual event indicator to ‘1’ beginning on that date. For IT enforcement, we do 
this separately for all benchmark countries (Non-IT Enforcement), countries in which the first IT prosecution took 
place before the start of our sample (Always IT-Enforcement), and countries without IT prosecution over the sample 
period (Never-IT Enforcement). In Panel C, we use firms that voluntarily switched to IFRS reporting before it 
became mandatory (Daske et al. 2012) and foreign firms whose shares are listed on a U.S. exchange (Hail and Leuz 
2009) as an additional benchmark group. That is, we add a separate binary indicator for these counterfactual firms to 
the model (Voluntary IFRS Firms and U.S. Cross-listed Firms), and code it as ‘1’ beginning on the informational 
event date. To capture selection effects, we also include a binary indicator variable that takes on the value of ‘1’ for 
all firm-years of the counterfactual firms. We require the voluntary IFRS and U.S. cross-listed firms to have at least 
one observation pre and post the informational event. The table reports logit coefficient estimates and (in 
parentheses) z-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by country. We also report p-values from F-tests 
comparing coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
 
Table 5: Sensitivity Analyses of the Changes in Dividend Payment Behavior around Informational Events 
Panel A: Mandatory IFRS Adoption as Informational Event 
Dividend Payments as  
Dependent Variable 
(1) 
Plus CFO over 
























No Year 2008 
Informational Events:        
  IFRS Adoption -0.335*** -0.186 -0.312*** -0.518** -0.740*** -0.311*** -0.282*** 
 (-3.39) (-1.33) (-3.15) (-2.26) (-3.20) (-2.60) (-3.06) 
Control Variables:        
  Dividend Paymentst-1 4.028*** 3.802*** 4.059*** 1.100*** 1.554*** 3.561*** 3.462*** 
 (9.17) (7.29) (9.36) (4.53) (6.64) (17.21) (16.79) 
  Share Repurchases 0.071 0.054 0.089 0.306*** 0.256*** 0.233 0.240 
 (0.77) (0.51) (0.95) (3.92) (3.28) (1.48) (1.25) 
  Log(Total Assets) 0.233*** 0.184*** 0.235*** 1.077*** 0.918*** 0.269*** 0.258*** 
 (9.23) (6.02) (9.18) (7.22) (4.08) (10.85) (9.85) 
  Market-to-Book -0.077*** -0.043*** -0.074*** -0.044** -0.016 -0.072*** -0.076*** 
 (-6.22) (-2.66) (-5.64) (-2.06) (-0.54) (-4.23) (-4.41) 
  Leverage -1.029*** -0.953*** -1.093*** -4.618*** -5.089*** -1.462*** -1.496*** 
 (-3.40) (-2.64) (-3.59) (-6.92) (-4.72) (-8.97) (-8.78) 
  Return on Assets 10.160*** 10.500*** 10.544*** 15.223*** 16.586*** 12.261*** 13.032*** 
 (7.46) (5.88) (7.79) (8.06) (5.78) (11.67) (11.46) 
  Return Variability -0.468*** -0.563*** -0.468*** -0.364*** -0.411*** -0.478*** -0.530*** 
 (-11.98) (-14.09) (-11.85) (-5.26) (-5.20) (-9.22) (-9.13) 
  CFO over Total Assets 1.224*** – – – – – – 
 (3.88)       
  Retained Earnings – 0.573*** – – – – – 
  (2.89)      
  Tax Rate Wedge – – -0.005 – – – – 
   (1.26)     
Country-, Industry-, and 
Year-Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Year- & Firm- 
Fixed Effects 
Year- & Firm- 
Fixed Effects Included Included 
Pseudo R2 65.6% 67.3% 65.4% 29.3% 35.6% 61.5% 61.6% 
N 165,351 106,993 168,296 46,485 20,928 128,043 111,600 
(continued) 
Table 5 (continued) 
Panel B: Insider Trading Enforcement as Informational Event 
Dividend Payments as  
Dependent Variable 
(1) 
Plus CFO over 






















Without Year  
of ! IT 
Enforcement 
Informational Events:        
  IT Enforcement -0.563** -0.614** -0.507** -0.704 -0.716* -0.548** -0.551** 
 (-2.36) (-2.19) (-2.13) (-1.64) (-1.82) (-2.22) (-2.22) 
Control Variables:        
  Dividend Paymentst-1 4.095*** 4.076*** 4.099*** 1.417*** 2.071*** 3.339*** 4.088*** 
 (7.51) (7.08) (7.62) (5.10) (8.74) (14.92) (7.57) 
  Share Repurchases 0.164*** 0.157** 0.172*** 0.248** 0.157 0.331 0.177*** 
 (2.77) (2.37) (3.12) (2.07) (0.92) (1.52) (2.79) 
  Log(Total Assets) 0.190*** 0.174*** 0.189*** 1.202*** 1.000*** 0.231*** 0.188*** 
 (7.45) (5.78) (6.74) (10.66) (6.53) (7.47) (6.67) 
  Market-to-Book -0.085*** -0.045*** -0.081*** -0.002 -0.025 -0.077*** -0.082*** 
 (-6.62) (-3.06) (-6.37) (-0.11) (-0.85) (-4.25) (-6.43) 
  Leverage -1.657*** -1.321*** -1.669*** -5.022*** -4.980*** -2.253*** -1.665*** 
 (-3.92) (-3.91) (-4.33) (-6.87) (-5.57) (-9.48) (-4.30) 
  Return on Assets 10.320*** 9.630*** 10.747*** 14.641*** 15.188*** 15.030*** 10.747*** 
 (4.44) (4.16) (4.60) (4.45) (3.27) (7.78) (4.63) 
  Return Variability -0.631*** -0.595*** -0.636*** -0.518*** -0.627*** -0.581*** -0.634*** 
 (-17.75) (-15.43) (-16.93) (-10.04) (-8.64) (-14.18) (-17.53) 
  CFO over Total Assets 1.266*** – – – – – – 
 (5.12)       
  Retained Earnings – 0.519*** – – – – – 
  (2.68)      
  Tax Rate Wedge – – 0.003 – – – – 
   (0.53)     
Country-, Industry-, and 
Year-Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Year- & Firm- 
Fixed Effects 
Year- & Firm- 
Fixed Effects Included Included 
Pseudo R2 67.4% 69.0% 67.3% 34.3% 41.2% 60.3% 67.1% 
N 159,913 148,559 163,743 45,747 28,098 110,577 163,304 
 
The table reports sensitivity analyses of our base specification (see Model 1 in Panel B of Table 3) examining changes in firms’ dividend payment behavior 
around (i) the mandatory introduction of IFRS reporting (Panel A), and (ii) the first enforcement of insider trading (IT) laws (Panel B). We use Dividend 
Payments as the dependent variable. In Panel A, we report results for the following models: (1) we add net cash flows from operations divided by total assets 
(CFO over Total Assets) as control variable. (2) We include Retained Earnings divided by the book value of total equity in the model. (3) We add the yearly 
Tax Rate Wedge as control variable, i.e., the difference between the dividend tax rate and the capital gains tax rate for individuals in a country. We collect tax 
rate information from the OECD and from publications by the big audit firms. Next, we replace the country and industry-fixed effects with firm-fixed effects 
for either the full sample (4) or the constant sample (5). (6) We exclude the largest sample country from the analysis (i.e., the U.S.). (7) We further exclude the 
year of the financial crisis (i.e., 2008). In Panel B, we replace model (7) with a model that omits the year in which the first IT prosecution took place in a 
country. The table reports logit coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) z-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
Table 6: Changes in the Information Content of Dividend Announcements around Informational Events 
Panel A: OLS Regression Analysis of Dividend Announcement Returns around Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Insider Trading Enforcement 
 Mandatory IFRS Adoption  Insider Trading Enforcement 
3-Day Absolute Dividend 



































Informational Events:          
  IFRS Adoption -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.007**  – – – – 
 (-2.36) (-3.33) (-2.08) (-2.57)      
  IT Enforcement – – – –  -0.004* -0.004** -0.004 -0.006*** 
      (-1.86) (-2.29) (-1.20) (-5.53) 
Control Variables:          
  Overlap with Earnings  0.005*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.002  0.002*** 0.001** 0.002** 0.003** 
    Announcement (3.73) (2.39) (5.14) (1.31)  (2.83) (2.28) (2.21) (2.24) 
  ! Dividend per Share 0.049*** 0.055** 0.183*** -0.088***  0.018 -0.009 0.176*** -0.106*** 
 (3.11) (2.72) (5.04) (-2.83)  (0.82) (-0.38) (5.69) (-3.51) 
  ! Earnings per Share -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.004**  0.001 0.003 0.005*** -0.000 
 (-1.38) (-0.25) (0.35) (-2.61)  (1.03) (1.53) (2.93) (-0.04) 
  Log(Total Assets) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (-8.31) (-9.62) (-6.98) (-4.43)  (-10.39) (-7.94) (-7.63) (-8.66) 
  Market-to-Book 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000 
 (0.23) (-0.40) (0.43) (-1.51)  (1.23) (0.66) (1.79) (-0.00) 
  Leverage 0.008** 0.008 0.007* 0.002  0.004* 0.004 0.001 0.002 
 (2.11) (1.67) (1.70) (1.10)  (1.88) (1.44) (0.75) (1.42) 
  Return on Assets 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.012*  0.004 -0.006 0.004 -0.005 
 (1.31) (0.76) (1.15) (1.69)  (0.38) (-0.47) (0.58) (-0.48) 
Country-, Industry-, and 
Year-Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 7.0% 6.9% 8.8% 8.2%  7.9% 8.7% 9.5% 7.6% 
N 63,723 35,326 40,608 12,466  65,720 42,862 40,612 13,496 
(continued) 
Table 6 (continued) 
Panel B: Sensitivity Analyses of the Dividend Announcement Returns around Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Insider Trading Enforcement 
 Mandatory IFRS Adoption  Insider Trading Enforcement 
3-Day Absolute Dividend 






























Without Year  
of ! IT 
Enforcement 
Informational Events:          
  IFRS Adoption -0.004 -0.004*** -0.004** -0.005**  – – – – 
 (-1.66) (-2.75) (-2.03) (-2.23)      
  IT Enforcement – – – –  -0.002 -0.003 -0.005** -0.005* 
      (-1.10) (-1.66) (-2.40) (-1.94) 
Control Variables:          
  Overlap with Earnings  0.004** 0.003 0.005*** 0.005***  0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 
    Announcement (2.07) (1.27) (3.61) (3.68)  (4.08) (4.07) (2.92) (2.67) 
  ! Dividend per Share 0.029** 0.024 0.056*** 0.060***  0.004 -0.016 0.028 0.018 
 (2.14) (1.10) (3.46) (3.10)  (0.14) (-0.56) (1.21) (0.82) 
  ! Earnings per Share -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001  0.002* 0.003 0.002* 0.001 
 (-1.36) (0.02) (-0.88) (0.79)  (1.76) (1.68) (1.77) (0.86) 
  Log(Total Assets) -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003***  -0.002** -0.002 -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-0.54) (-0.62) (-11.67) (-9.01)  (-2.26) (-1.61) (-10.67) (-10.32) 
  Market-to-Book -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.28) (-1.67) (0.77) (0.83)  (-0.85) (-1.45) (0.89) (1.19) 
  Leverage 0.006 0.003 0.009** 0.009**  0.004 0.002 0.005** 0.003* 
 (1.17) (0.50) (2.57) (2.43)  (0.75) (0.52) (2.72) (1.83) 
  Return on Assets 0.011 0.001 0.013 0.011  0.001 -0.002 0.009 0.003 
 (0.88) (0.06) (1.13) (1.13)  (0.08) (-0.12) (0.97) (0.37) 
Country-, Industry-, and 
Year-Fixed Effects 
Year- & Firm- 
Fixed Effects 
Year- & Firm- 
Fixed Effects Included Included  
Year- & Firm- 
Fixed Effects 
Year- & Firm- 
Fixed Effects Included Included 
Adjusted R2 35.2% 29.0% 6.1% 6.3%  33.8% 24.5% 7.2% 8.0% 
N 63,723 35,326 53,550 48,670  65,720 42,862 49,592 65,044 
(continued) 
 
Table 6 (continued) 
Panel C: Changes in Dividend Announcement Returns for Firms Not Directly Affected by the Informational Event 
Around Mandatory  
IFRS Adoption  
Around Insider  
Trading Enforcement 3-Day Absolute Dividend 















Counterfactual Firms:      
  Voluntary IFRS Firms -0.004 –  0.018 – 
 (-1.62)   (1.20)  
  U.S. Cross-listed Firms – 0.000  – 0.010*** 
  (0.06)   (4.28) 
Informational Event Firms:      
  IFRS Adoption -0.004** -0.004**  – – 
 (-2.37) (-2.39)    
  IT Enforcement – –  -0.004* -0.004* 
    (-1.85) (-1.86) 
      
F-Test for Difference across 
Coefficients [p-value] [0.778] [0.214]  [0.159] [0.004] 
      
Indicator for Counterfactual Firms  Included Included  Included Included 
Control Variables Included Included  Included Included 
Fixed Effects Included Included  Included Included 
N 65,430 64,490  65,738 65,789 
 
The table reports changes in the information content of firms’ dividend announcements following a significant 
change in the information environment. We consider two informational events: (i) the mandatory introduction of 
IFRS reporting (from 2001 to 2008), and (ii) the first enforcement of insider trading (IT) laws (from 1993 to 2004). 
We report results for the full sample (see Table 1) and, where indicated, a ‘constant’ sample for which we require at 
least eight observations per firm. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based 
on robust standard errors clustered by country from regressing the absolute values of the three-day Dividend 
Announcement Returns on an informational event indicator plus controls. The IFRS Adoption variable takes on the 
value of ‘1’ for fiscal years ending on or after December 31 of the year of the IFRS mandate; the IT Enforcement 
variable takes on the value of ‘1’ for all fiscal years ending in or after the year of the first IT prosecution. For details 
on the remaining variables see Tables 1 and 2. In Panel A, we report results for (1) all announcements of dividend 
payments, (2) the announcement of dividend per share increases only, and (3) the announcement of dividend per 
share decreases only. In Panel B, we report the following sensitivity analyses: we replace the country and 
industry-fixed effects with firm-fixed effects for either the full sample (1) or the constant sample (2). (3) We exclude 
the largest sample country from the analysis (i.e., the U.S.). (4) We further exclude the year of the financial crisis 
(i.e., 2008) or, in the IT setting, omit the year in which the first IT prosecution took place in a country. In Panel C, 
we use firms that voluntarily switched to IFRS reporting before it became mandatory (Daske et al. 2012) and foreign 
firms whose shares are listed on a U.S. exchange (Hail and Leuz 2009) as an additional benchmark group. That is, 
we add a separate binary indicator for these counterfactual firms to the model (Voluntary IFRS Firms and U.S. 
Cross-listed Firms), and code it as ‘1’ beginning on the informational event date. To capture selection effects, we 
also include a binary indicator variable that takes on the value of ‘1’ for all firm-years of the counterfactual firms. 
We require the voluntary IFRS and U.S. cross-listed firms to have at least one observation pre and post the 
informational event. Panel C also reports p-values from F-tests comparing coefficients. Throughout the table, we 
include country-, industry, and year-fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
 
Table 7: Analysis of Changes in Dividend Payments around Alternative Informational Events 























Informational Events:      
  Voluntary IFRS Adoption -0.444*** -0.006***  – – 
 (-2.78) (-3.35)    
  U.S. Exchange Listing – –  -0.115 -0.000 
    (-1.00) (-0.19) 
Control Variables:      
  Dividend Paymentst-1 4.075*** –  4.174*** – 
 (7.65)   (8.99)  
  Share Repurchases 0.180*** –  0.156*** – 
 (2.85)   (2.77)  
  Overlap with Earnings  – 0.002***  – 0.003** 
    Announcement  (2.88)   (2.52) 
  ! Dividend per Share – 0.018  – 0.031** 
  (0.85)   (2.16) 
  ! Earnings per Share – 0.001  – -0.001 
  (1.04)   (-0.73) 
  Log(Total Assets) 0.190*** -0.002***  0.216*** -0.002*** 
 (6.70) (-10.50)  (8.01) (-10.07) 
  Market-to-Book -0.081*** 0.000  -0.071*** 0.000 
 (-6.45) (1.24)  (-5.72) (0.75) 
  Leverage -1.666*** 0.004*  -1.376*** 0.006** 
 (-4.34) (1.88)  (-4.15) (2.26) 
  Return on Assets 10.793*** 0.004  10.181*** 0.010 
 (4.64) (0.41)  (5.90) (0.93) 
  Return Variability -0.635*** –  -0.539*** – 
 (-17.79)   (-14.85)  
  Indicator for Counterfactual  0.323*** 0.003  -0.102 0.003* 
     Firms (2.70) (1.11)  (-0.98) (1.92) 
Country-, Industry-, and  
Year-Fixed Effects Included Included  Included Included 
Pseudo R2 (Adjusted R2) 67.0% 7.9%  65.4% 7.0% 
N 166,538 66,260  257,932 103,845 
N Treatment Firm-Years 1,035 254  2,453 847 
N Treatment Firms 325 114  354 140 
 
The table reports changes in firms’ dividend payment behavior and in the information content of firms’ dividend 
announcements following a significant change in the information environment. We consider two (firm-level) 
informational events: (i) the voluntary switch to IFRS reporting before it became mandatory (from 1993 to 2004), 
and (ii) the cross listing of foreign firms’ shares on a U.S. exchange (from 1993 to 2008). The sample consists of our 
base sample (see Table 1) plus the voluntary IFRS and U.S. cross-listed firms. We require the voluntary IFRS and 
U.S. cross-listed firms to have at least one observation pre and post the informational event. The table reports logit 
(OLS) coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) z-statistics (t-statistics) based on robust standard errors clustered by 
country from estimating Model 1 in Panel B of Table 3 (in Panel A of Table 6). The Voluntary IFRS Adoption 
variable takes on the value of ‘1’ for fiscal years with reporting under the new accounting standards (as identified by 
Daske et al. 2012); the U.S. Exchange Listing variable takes on the value of ‘1’ for all fiscal years following the 
initiation of the cross-listing program (as identified by Hail and Leuz 2009). To capture selection effects, we also 
include a binary indicator variable that takes on the value of ‘1’ for all firm-years of the voluntary IFRS and U.S. 
cross-listed firms. For details on the remaining variables see Tables 1 and 2. We include country-, industry, and 
year-fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
